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Professionals or Politicians: The Uncertain Empirical Case for an
Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary
Stephen J. Choi
G. Mitu Gulati
Eric A. Posner1
August 21, 2007
Abstract. Although federal judges are appointed with life tenure, most state judges are elected for
short terms. Conventional wisdom holds that appointed judges are superior to elected judges
because appointed judges are less vulnerable to political pressure. However, there is little
empirical evidence for this view. Using a dataset of state high court opinions, we construct
objective measures for three aspects of judicial performance: effort, skill and independence. The
measures permit a test of the relationship between performance and the four primary methods of
state high court judge selection: partisan election, non-partisan election, merit plan, and
appointment. The empirical results do not show appointed judges performing at a higher level
than their elected counterparts. Appointed judges write higher quality opinions than elected
judges do, but elected judges write many more opinions, and the evidence suggests that the large
quantity difference makes up for the small quality difference. In addition, elected judges do not
appear less independent than appointed judges. The results suggest that elected judges are more
focused on providing service to the voters (that is, they behave like politicians), whereas
appointed judges are more focused on their long-term legacy as creators of precedent (that is, they
behave like professionals).
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“If the state has a problem with judicial impartiality, it is largely one the state
brought upon itself by continuing the practice of popularly electing judges”.
Justice O’Connor, concurring in Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 792
(2002).

1.

Introduction
Justice O’Connor’s backhanded put-down of Minnesota’s elected judiciary

reflects the conventional wisdom among lawyers and scholars that judges should be
appointed by elected officials or independent commissions, and should not be elected
themselves (Geyh 2003; Tarr 2003). The conventional wisdom reflects a deeply rooted
conviction that voters are too unsophisticated to evaluate judges and candidates for
judicial office. When judges use campaign contributions to finance simple-minded
television commercials, conflict of interest is layered on public confusion. However, this
conviction is hardly self-evident. In a system that uses judicial appointments, nothing
forces the appointing official to select judges on the basis of their legal ability; cronyism
is very common. And, as the literature on voting shows, ordinary people use various
strategies for evaluating candidates whose qualifications they do not fully understand. For
example, they rely on party endorsements and newspaper editorials, and the give-andtake of the campaign.2 And when many people participate in a decisionmaking process,
aggregation of information occurs, which can produce more accurate results than when
the decision is made by only one person.
The relative merits of appointment and electoral systems are an empirical
question, but what exactly should be tested? Most empirical work on this topic focuses on
judicial independence, the willingness of a judge to vote against the ideological interests
of the party of the elected official who appointed her or of the party to which she belongs.
2

Newspaper endorsements of judicial candidates are common.

However, independence captures only a part of the judge’s role. Judges are supposed to
be independent but not to be arbitrary: a judge who votes against her party may still make
bad decisions. And an independent judge who is lazy will not resolve many cases, or will
resolve them poorly. The measures of independence that have been used in the literature
imply that the best judicial system would be one in which Democratic judges voted in
favor of Republican interests and Republican judges voted in favor of Democratic
interests. It is as though empirical studies of central banks focused exclusively on
whether central banks made decisions that contradicted the expressed desires of the
government, and not on whether their decisions were correct, as a matter of monetary
policy. Central bank independence is important but a central bank that always decided the
opposite of what the government sought would not necessarily be a good one. The same
can be said about judges.
To test the conventional wisdom that appointed judges are better than elected
judges, we use a tripartite definition of judicial quality—productivity, opinion-quality,
and independence. Productivity refers to the number of opinions a judge writes in a
particular time period such as a year. The more opinions a judge writes, the more disputes
she has resolved—and dispute resolution is the chief function of the judge. Opinionquality refers to the opinion’s reasoning. Better-reasoned opinions explain to the parties
why they won or lost, but much more important, they provide guidance to future judges
who face similar cases, and to people and businesses who want to avoid litigation in the
first place. And independence refers to the willingness of judges to follow the law rather
than the interests of political parties.
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The independent variable of interest is the selection method for high court judges.
In 12 states, judges are appointed by governors (or, in few instances, legislatures). At the
opposite extreme, judges in 9 states run for election—and reelection—as members of
political parties. In between, there are two systems that combine partisan and nonpartisan elements. In 16 states, merit commissions are used: typically, an independent
commission provides nominees whom the governor may appoint, while a retention
election is used at the end of a judge’s term (rather than a competitive election). In 13
states, non-partisan elections are held: the public votes but judges are not permitted to
advertise themselves as members of particular political parties.
A small empirical literature has investigated the relationship between selection
systems and judicial characteristics in the states. As noted above, the literature has
focused on judicial independence and not other attributes of quality (Cann 2007; McLeod
2007; Shepherd 2007), and suggests that appointed judges are more independent than
elected judges. Our tests of independence produce more complicated results and does not
favor either system in a clear way. As for overall quality, again the literature assumes that
appointed judges are better – albeit, with little attempt to measure quality (Cann 2007).3
We find that elected judges are more productive. And although appointed judges write
opinions that are cited more often, the difference is small and outweighed by the
productivity difference. In other words, in a given time period, the product of opinion
number and citations-per-opinion is higher for elected judges than for appointed judges.
3

There are a handful of empirical studies that do attempt to construct quality measures so as to evaluate
judicial performance. These studies use either surveys or measures of the educational qualifications of the
judges as their dependent variables (Cann 2007; Glick and Emmert 1987; Canon 1972). Surveys may
reflect the biases of the respondents as we discuss in the text. As for educational and professional
qualifications, those look to be more appropriate as an independent variable rather than as a measure of
judging quality. (As we discuss below, there are interesting differences overlooked in the literature: elected
judges went to worse law schools but have stronger local ties than appointed judges do.)
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After discussing our results, we attempt an explanation for why elected judges
might differ in these ways from appointed judges. We argue that elected judges tend to be
politicians while appointed judges tend to be professionals. Professionals care about their
reputation among a national community of like-minded professionals, while politicians
care about their reputation in the local community of lay voters and politicians.
Appointed judges thus labor to write opinions that will be admired, while elected judges
try to satisfy as many litigants as possible by dispensing quick but adequate justice.
Although our evidence does not prove that elected judges are superior to appointed
judges, it casts doubt on the conventional wisdom, and broadens the scholarly debate.

2.

Theory

2.1

The Determinants of Judicial Quality
Beginning with the legal realists, scholars and even judges themselves have

speculated about the motives of judges, and whether judges decide cases by applying the
law in a neutral fashion or in a manner that reflects personal or political views, or both
(e.g., Cross 2005; Newman 1984). Because American judges have the power to strike
down laws, the early controversy about judges’ motives led to a debate about the proper
role of judges in the constitutional system. If judges are ideologically motivated, then
their power to strike down laws sits uneasily with democratic commitments; if they are
not, or if their ideological motives are constrained, then judicial review has many
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attractive properties, including possibly the ability to prevent majorities from exploiting
minorities or otherwise supporting bad law.4
In recent years, this debate has reemerged in the framework of an agency model,
which treats the judiciary or individual judges as agents, and the public or particular
elected officials as the principals (e.g., Maskin and Tirole 2004). Agency models warn
that agents, unless properly selected, monitored, and rewarded, will not act in the
interests of principals. In the context of the judiciary, political institutions need to be
designed to ensure that people with preferences similar to that of the public are selected
to be judges, and that judges be given the right incentives to decide cases according to the
law.
With respect to selection, judges should be impartial and competent, rather than
partisan, ideological, eccentric, or incompetent. What selection mechanism will ensure
that good, rather than bad, people are selected to be judges and that they will remain good
after they become judges? Elections might ensure that people with mainstream views
become judges, but the electorate may not be able to evaluate a potential judge’s legal
ability and other technical qualifications, let alone whether she is misleading the
electorate in terms of her future fidelity to what is best for the populace. Appointments
might result in competent and politically mainstream judges; however, elected officials
might prefer to use judgeships as patronage positions. Unhappiness with these two
extremes has led, in many states, to reliance on commissions, combinations of
appointments and elections, and other complex mechanisms.

4

The vast literature cannot be described here. Holmes (1988) traces the history of this debate. Bickel
(1986) is the source of the modern debate in constitutional law. Croley (1995) brings the debate to bear on
state courts.
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With respect to incentives, judges should, in principle, face sanctions if they
decide cases poorly and rewards if they decide cases well. However, if rewards and
sanctions are used, someone must apply them, and if that person has political power,
judges might be afraid to decide cases impartially. The federal system avoids this risk by
giving judges lifetime tenure on good behavior, but the danger with such a system is that
it allows judges to decide cases badly or in a partisan fashion, without fear of sanction.
Most state systems attempt to constrain judges by forcing them to undergo reelection or a
reappointment process, but the danger is that judges will decide cases in partisan fashion
so as to avoid a partisan sanction.
Some history illustrates the tensions (Hanssen 2004). Legislatures dominated the
judicial selection and retention process between 1790 and 1847 on account of colonial era
suspicion of the executive and the judiciary, both of which were arms of the British;
however, some states retained gubernatorial appointment systems. Corruption among the
legislatures and the spread of Jacksonian democracy stimulated the growth of electoral
judiciaries beginning around 1850. Progressive-era distrust of electorates led to adoption
of nonpartisan judicial elections at the turn of the century, and then the rise of merit
plans. Merit plans generally created commissions that appointed judges, and used
retention elections to discipline them. Though ideological currents clearly played a role in
this history, the changes can easily be put in the agency framework, as Hanssen (2004)
depicts. Reliance on partisan mechanisms reflected fears about the incentives of
governors and then legislators to select and reappoint the proper sort of judge; the shift
toward nonpartisan mechanisms reflected concerns about the ability of the public to
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evaluate judges.5 Today, most scholars reject electoral systems (e.g., Fordham
Symposium 2007).
The empirical literature on judicial behavior has focused primarily on federal
judges, and especially on the U.S. Supreme Court (George 1998). One vein of this
literature establishes that judges’ voting behavior reflects partisan or ideological
preferences, at least to some extent. Judges who are Republicans or who are supported, at
time of appointment, by conservative media, tend to vote in an ideologically conservative
way; a corresponding bias characterizes Democrats (Segal and Spaeth 2002). This work
confirms that unconstrained judges do not necessarily decide cases impartially and casts
doubt on the assumption that appointment systems are necessarily best. Another vein in
the literature shows that structural and institutional features influence and constrain
judges’ incentives to vote once on the bench. For example, perhaps because of
whistleblower or group polarization effects, federal judges vote less ideologically when
the panel is split by party than when it is not (Cross and Tiller 1998, Sunstein et al. 2004).
A smaller empirical literature on the state courts has come to similar results.
Brace and various coauthors find correlations between voting and ideology, analogous to
the federal court studies (e.g., Brace et al., 2001, Brace et al. 2006). Tabarrok and
Helland (1999) find that tort awards are higher in electoral states than in non-electoral
states. They argue that their results reflect the stronger incentives of elected judges to
redistribute wealth from out-of-state corporations to in-state voters and to please the local
trial bar (see also Helland and Tabarrok 2002). Hanssen (1999) finds more litigation in
non-electoral states than in electoral states. He argues that high court judges in non5

Berkowitz and Clay (2006) find that legislative preferences with respect to judicial independence may be
connected to the type of legal system (civil or common law) of the nation that originally settled the areas
that became states.
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electoral states have more independence, and therefore are under less pressure to decide
cases consistently. Greater uncertainty about the law generates more litigation. Hanssen
(2000) finds that state bureaucracies are larger in non-electoral states than in electoral
states, which he attributes to defensive efforts by the agencies to protect themselves from
less politically constrained judges. Pinello (1995) finds that appointed judges are more
likely to favor criminal defendants than elected judges are. Besley and Payne (2006) find
that employment discrimination claims are more numerous in electoral states than in nonelectoral states, which they argue shows that elected judges are more likely to rule in
favor of employees than appointed judges are. Berkowitz and Clay (2006) find that the
quality of state courts, as measured by surveys of senior attorneys at wealthy companies,
is positively correlated with nonpartisan judicial retention procedures. Shepherd (2007)
focuses on the political party of “retention agents”—those people who decide whether a
judge will be retained or not—and finds that judges (of whatever party) are more likely to
vote in favor of traditional Republican interests when retention agents are Republicans,
and are more likely to vote in favor of traditional Democratic interests when retention
agents are Democrats. The effect is larger when the retention process is electoral than
when it involves reappointment. An early study by Landes and Posner (1980) finds that
citations (including federal and out-of-state citations) of state supreme court opinions are
uncorrelated with selection system.
The literature, taken as a whole, provides evidence that selection and retention
institutions influence judicial outcomes—by influencing who becomes a judge, or how
judges decide cases, or both. The literature also confirms that judges are influenced by
political factors. The literature largely skirts our topic—whether elected judges are,
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overall, better or worse than appointed judges—but offers tantalizing hints. The Tabarrok
and Helland studies imply that elected judges are better agents of their constituents than
are appointed judges; the social problem they identify is due to the federal structure of the
country and the overlapping jurisdictions of states. Hanssen’s (1999) finding that
electoral pressures force state judges to be more consistent implies that elected judges are
better—more consistent opinions, all else equal, are better than inconsistent opinions.
Berkowitz and Clay (2006) do use a measure of overall judicial quality based on the
views of senior attorneys at wealthy companies, but, as they acknowledge (pp. 412–13),
the views of these senior attorneys are hardly unbiased. Landes and Posner’s (1980) study
is closest to ours, but they do not look at productivity and independence, and their study
has several methodological limitations.6 Our results are quite different from theirs.
Following the literature, we envision the relationship between the public and the
judiciary as an agency relationship. The optimal selection mechanism minimizes agency
costs. Judges expend unobservable effort to decide cases. Agency costs can take two
forms: laziness (resulting in bad opinions or few opinions) and ideological selfindulgence (biased opinions). The optimal selection mechanism screens out judges with a
strong preference for laziness or ideological self-indulgence and/or punishes judges who
are observably lazy or ideologically self-indulgent.

6

We use a larger sample, different variable definitions, and many more control variables. Their study is
mainly about the federal courts. And their data come from a different era, before the modern concern about
excessive political competition among state court justices fueled by campaign donations (Carrington 1998).
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2.1

Judicial Quality and Judicial Selection Mechanisms

2.1.1

Judicial Quality
We use three measures of judicial quality.
Productivity. Judges have some discretion over how many opinions they write.

Judges who write slowly will write fewer opinions. Judges who are lazy and wish to
avoid writing concurrences and dissents, will also write fewer opinions. We measure a
judge’s productivity using the total number of opinions she writes during our sample time
period (1998-2000), including majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions.
Productivity is a measure of effort, but is also a measure of quality because, all
else equal, more opinions settle a greater number of legal disputes and resolve more legal
issues. However, not all else is equal. A judge who writes more opinions might devote
less time to each opinion, so that quality suffers. So productivity is at best only a partial
measure of quality.
Citations. We assume, consistently with the rapidly expanding literature on
judicial citations, that citations are a measure of quality (e.g., Baker 2007; Cross and
Lindquist 2006; Lott 2005; Landes, Lessig and Solimine 1998). Better opinions are cited
more frequently than worse opinions. An opinion is cited frequently because it resolves a
legal question or identifies some new legal problem or represents an advance in the law
or simply clarifies doctrine. We focus on out-of-state citations because this allows us to
control for the possibility that in-state citations reflect local legal customs or conventions.
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To check for robustness, we further subdivide citations into federal, state, and law review
citations.7
Independence. Judges have the duty to enforce the law impartially, without regard
to the legally irrelevant characteristics of the litigants or the goals of political parties. We
thus assume that better judges are more independent. Some studies (e.g., Shepherd 2007)
measure independence by the propensity of a judge to vote against interests associated
with her party—for example, a Republican judge voting in favor of an employee and
against an employer. This measure of independence focuses exclusively on the vote in the
case and does not take into account the direction of the opinion’s reasoning. It would, for
example, code an opinion that decides a particular case against an employee, but creates
precedent through its reasoning that would assist later employee suits, as Republican.
And then there is the question of whether coding a vote against an employee and for the
employer, regardless of the facts of the case, gets at the Republican/Democrat distinction
at all. To avoid the foregoing pitfalls, we look directly at when judges decide to write
opinions against judges of the same or opposite party. We posit that a judge who writes
several dissents against majority opinions authored by judges of the same party (or
majority opinions against dissents of same party judges) is more independent than a judge
who rarely dissents and never against a judge of the same party.
Our measure of independence is imperfect, and we address its problems and
alternatives subsequently. For now, we note two problems. First, the measure can be
distorted by personal animosities. Personal animosities might cause judges to refuse to
join opinions as often as they otherwise would (Choi and Gulati 2004). Second, there
7

The problems with citations studies have been rehearsed elsewhere and we will not repeat them here (for
example, on the possibility of bias, see Abramowicz and Tiller 2005; Bhattacharya and Smyth 2004; Choi
and Gulati 2007).
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might be judges who are excessively partisan. These excessively partisan judges, because
they view their co-partisan colleagues as not partisan enough, may end up dissenting a lot
against the moderate judges from their own party. Such behavior – extremely partisan
behavior – may then be interpreted as independence.

2.1.2

Selection Mechanisms
State judicial selection mechanisms can be divided in several ways. The literature

has not arrived at a consistent methodology, and our approach differs from those of other
researchers. Nonetheless, the approaches are roughly consistent, and we test ours for
robustness. We divide judicial selection mechanisms into four categories (Table 1).
<<Insert Table 1 About Here>>
Governor or Legislative Appointment. In 12 states, judges are appointed by the
governor or (in South Carolina and Virginia) the legislature. Gubernatorial appointments
usually require the consent of the upper house of the legislature or the participation of a
special commission such as an executive council. In most of these states, judges serve a
term (ranging from 6 to 14 years) and then may be reappointed in the same manner. In
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island, judges enjoy lifetime or near-lifetime
tenure.
Merit Plan. In 16 states, judges are nominated by a nonpartisan commission, and
then appointed by the governor. Judges serve a term and then are subject to a retention
election, where they run alone, and voters can either approve another term or vote against
them. Terms vary but on the whole are less than those in appointment states.
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Nonpartisan Election. In 13 states, judges run for election. Their political
affiliations are not listed on the ballot, and so voters, unless specifically informed, do not
know a candidate’s political party. These judges serve a term and then may run for
reelection. The terms range from 6 to 10 years.
Partisan Election. In 9 states, judges run for election as a member of a political
party. They serve a term in the range of 6 to 10 years for the most part and then may run
for reelection.
Readers might be skeptical about whether voters care much about judicial
elections and use the elections as an opportunity to reward good judges and punish bad
judges. Hall (2001) finds that only 8.3 percent of state supreme court judges seeking
reelection between 1980–94 were defeated. Hall, nonetheless, reports a great deal of
variation across time and selection systems. In partisan elections, judges during this
period were defeated 18.8 percent of the time; in 1994, 36 percent of them were defeated.
And judges’ electoral success appears to hinge on their ideological similarity to voters.
“The fact of the matter ... is that supreme court justices face competition that is, by two of
three measures, equivalent if not higher to that for the U.S House” (Hall 2001, p. 319).
(For further discussion, see Dudley 1997, Aspin 1999, and Geyh 2003).
We should note that each state has a unique system; the categorizations suppress a
great deal of variation. For example, the governor of Massachusetts appoints nominees of
a judicial selection commission while the governor of Maine makes appointments subject
to confirmation by the Senate. Massachusetts judges serve until the age of 70; Maine
judges have seven year terms, at the end of which they may be reappointed by the
governor, again subject to Senate confirmation. These differences have led to different
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coding practices in the literature, with some authors focusing on retention (e.g., Shepherd
2007) and others on selection procedures (e.g., Besley and Payne 2006); some using only
two categories, others using multiple categories, and so forth.
Our categorization is similar to that of the other authors. The main concern is that
if selection is relatively nonpartisan, and retention is relatively partisan, our selection
variable will be misleading. Fortunately, it appears that the degree of partisanship tends
to be the same at selection and retention decisions, and indeed tenure length is negatively
correlated with the partisanship of the selection process (see Table 5, below).

2.2

Hypothesis
Conventional wisdom is that appointed judges are better than elected judges. If so,

appointed judges should have higher productivity, citation numbers, and independence.
The existing empirical literature provides some support for the hypothesis that appointed
judges are more independent. Our analysis adds an analysis of productivity and citation
numbers in addition to a new measure of independence to get at the underlying question
of whether appointed judges are of higher quality than elected judges.

3.

Data Description

3.1

The Dataset
We examine the decisions of all the judges of the highest court of every state for

the years 1998, 1999, and 2000. The District of Columbia is excluded because of its
anomalous position. Two states—Texas and Oklahoma—have two highest courts, one
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with jurisdiction over civil appeals and the other with jurisdiction over criminal appeals.
We, in effect, treat these courts as separate state courts: so we have 52 “states.”
Each court has a certain number of seats, but we count judges, rather than seats,
so if turnover occurs, a court will have more judges than seats; and, if some seats are left
empty, there could be fewer judges than seats. Our dataset contains 408 judges, about 8
per court. The average judge spent 2.65 of the 3 years in our sample period on the court.
And each judge wrote on average about 67 opinions per year.
We organize the data in three ways. For productivity, we run judge-year level
regressions. Each observation is a judge for a particular year; there are 1082
observations—that is, the product of 408 and 2.65. For citations, we run opinion-level
regressions to allow us to assess the factors that lead to citations to specific majority
opinions. There are 27,596 majority opinion observations in our dataset. For
independence, we run judge-level regressions on data pooled from 1998 to 2000, and
hence there are 408 observations. We assume that a judge’s independence does not
change over the 1998 to 2000 time period and use pooled data to obtain as large a sample
as possible of opposing opinions with which to construct our independence measure. In
many of our regressions, the actual number of observations is lower as a result of
inadequate data for variables of interest.

3.2

Measures of Judicial Quality

3.2.1 Productivity
Productivity is measured by total number of opinions written for any given year,
including dissents and concurrences (Total Opinions). Our least productive judge wrote
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two opinions in one year,8 while our most productive judge wrote 263 opinions in one
year. The mean was 67 opinions per year. Table 2 provides productivity data, arranged by
type of selection system.
<<Insert Table 2 About Here>>
A pattern is evident. Judges in more partisan systems are more productive than
judges in less partisan systems. The difference between the mean level of Total Opinions
for Election Partisan compared with Appointed judges is significant at the <1% level.
Judges in more partisan systems also write greater numbers of dissents than judges in less
partisan systems—an issue to which we will return. The difference between the mean
Dissenting Opinions for Election Partisan compared with Appointed is significant at the
<1% level.

3.2.2

Opinion Quality
Our primary quality variable is the number of out-of-state citations to a particular

opinion by a particular judge (Outside State Citations). We also look at narrower
measures—such as law review citations and outside federal court citations.
The best measure of quality is citation by an outside court—including another
state court or outside federal court. Inside state and home federal court citations are
driven to large extent by precedent. Looking at only outside citations allows us to
examine those citations where judges have greater discretion to pick which opinions to
cite. For the most part, judges are citing these outside opinions because they are helpful,
not because the opinion has precedential force. Because of this discretion, an outside

8

Probably because the judge left office early in the year, entered office late in the year, was sick during the
year, or had administrative duties.
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circuit citation represents a better indication of which opinions judges deem of higher
quality. Table 3 provides citation data, categorized by selection system.
<<Insert Table 3 About Here>>
The citation pattern reported in Table 3 is strong. Appointed and other judges
subject to less partisan pressures have higher per-opinion outside citation levels than both
non-partisan and partisan elected judges. The differences in the mean levels of Outside
State Citations for non-partisan and partisan election judges compared with appointed
judges are significant at the <1% level. This pattern carries through for law review
citations as well (where the differences are again significant at the <1% level).

3.2.3

Independence
Our independence measure focuses on the tendency of judges to write opinions

that disagree with co-partisans when the pool of judges provides opportunities to do so.9
We define an “opposing opinion” as either a majority opinion when a dissent exists, or a
dissent when a majority exists. We assume that a judge exhibits independence when she
writes an opposing opinion against a co-partisan.
We obtain a measure of the political party for each judge in our sample. We
looked to three sources of information on party membership. First, we searched NEXIS
and the Internet (using Google) for any news reports on the political affiliation of the
each judge. Second, we also searched for information on political contributions at the
opensecrets.org website. We used the political party of the donee candidate as a proxy for
the political party of judges who contributed. Third, we used the party of the governor (if
9

The variable is defined as follows: indep = (demopratio - opdisratio)*(republican = 1)+ (repopratio –
opdisratio)*(democrat = 1), where demopratio is the fraction of majority opinions in the state written by a
Democrat (and similarly for repopratio), and opdisratio is the fraction of opposing opinions written by the
judge in question against a Democrat.
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any) who appointed the judge as a proxy for the judge’s political party. In most of the
cases where we had multiple sources of information on political party, the party was
consistent across these sources. When our three sources reported different parties, we
gave first priority to the party identified through our NEXIS and Internet searches and
second to the party identified in the opensecrets.org database.
We define Opposite_Party as the number of opposing opinions written, by the
judge of interest, against a judge of the opposite party divided by the number of opposing
opinions written against a judge of either party from 1998 to 2000. Thus, this variable
measures propensity to side with co-partisans. Not all opposing opinions are driven by
the ideology of the opposing judges. A judge who dissents at random would dissent 70
percent of the time against an opposite party judge if the background pool of majority
opinions consisted of 70 percent opposite party authored opinions. To take into account
the background pool of opinions, we define Opposite Pool as the total number of majority
opinions authored by an opposite party judge divided by the total number of majority
opinions authored by either an opposite or same party judge (not including the judge in
question) from 1998 to 2000.
We define Independence as Opposite_Pool minus Opposite_Party. A more
negative Independence score corresponds to a judge who writes opposing opinions
against opposite party judges more frequently than the background pool of majority
opinions authored by opposite party judges. Conversely, a more positive Independence
score corresponds to an authoring judge who writes opposing opinions less frequently
against opposite party judges compared with the background pool of opinions (and thus
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more frequently against co-partisans). We treat a more positive Independence score as
indicative of a more independent judge.10
Table 4 reports summary statistics on our Independence measure. Only judges for
whom we could identify a political party were included in the analysis, and only judges
from states that had a mixture of judges from different political parties were included.
<<Insert Table 4 About Here>>
Panel A of Table 4 reports the mean Independence level for judges associated
with the different selection systems for high court judges. Note that unlike our
productivity measures discussed above, Independence is based on pooled data from
1998–2000. We do not expect the Independence of a judge to vary by year, and pooling
the data enables us to increase the amount of data used to generate the Independence
measure for any particular judge. From Panel A, note that the mean Independence level
was negative for judges associated with all four different selection systems. Judges tend
to write opposing opinions more against opposite party judges relative to the background
pool of majority opinions
Judges subject to partisan election have the highest independence. Judges subject
to non-partisan election have the lowest independence. However, the differences between
the mean Independence scores for non-partisan election judges and merit selection and
appointed judges are not statistically significant. Only the difference between the mean

10

Consider, for example, a Republican judge sitting on a high court in a state where the other judges are
split 50-50 between Republican and Democrat judges and the pool of majority opinions written by other
judges corresponds to this 50-50 split. Suppose our Republican judge authors 10 dissents and 20 majority
opinions where there is a dissenting opinion. And suppose that 5 of the 10 dissents are authored against a
Democrat judge and 15 of the 20 majority opinions face a dissent from a Democrat judge. In this case,
Opposite_Party would equal (5+15)/(10+20) = 2/3. Opposite_Pool equals 1/2. Independence would then
equal 1/2 – 2/3 = – 1/6. Because of the tendency of our Republican judge to write an opposing opinion
more frequently against Democrats compared with the background pool of majority opinions, the
Republican judge receives a negative Independence score.
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Independence score for non-partisan election and partisan election judges is significant
(at the 10 percent confidence level only), which is a bit puzzling.
The bottom line is that the data is consistent with the findings in the empirical
literature that judicial opinions reflect partisan or ideological bias. However, the data
does not support the received wisdom that appointed judges are more independent than
electoral judges.
This partial result could reflect problems with our Independence measure. There
are two main problems. First, consider the extreme case where all judges on a particular
state high court are all of the same political party (say all Republican). In this case, our
Independence measure will equal zero since Opposite_Party will equal Opposite_Pool
(and both will equal zero since there are no Democrat-authored opinions). Our analysis in
Table 4 excludes judges who come from states with no variation in political party among
judges for this reason. But, by the same token, we lose data.
Second, even where all judges are not of the same political party in a state, if an
imbalance exists, the range of the Independence variable will vary. Consider two
Republican judges. One is in a state with 90 percent of the majority opinions written by
Democrats and the other is in a state with 10 percent of the majority opinions written by
Democrats. For the first, Independence can range from –0.1 to +0.9. For the second,
Independence can range from –0.9 to +0.1. So the second judge could have a much more
negative Independence score than the first judge simply because the range is shifted over.
To address these problems, we try a number of different approaches.
First, we create a version of the Independence variable that is less dependent on
the background political makeup of a particular state court. Independence_Indicator is
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defined as 1 if Independence is greater or equal to zero and 0 otherwise. The indicator
variable addresses the range problem but also throws out information: it suggests judges
subject to non-partisan elections are less independent than the other types, who are about
the same. The last column of Panel A of Table 4 reports on the mean of
Independence_Indicator. None of the differences in mean Independence_Indicator levels
among the varying selection systems are statistically significant.
Second, we consider the possibility that the act of writing a dissenting opinion
(even against opposite-partisan judges) can be a greater display of independence than
writing a majority opinion (even against co-partisan dissenters). Judges who write
dissents display independence in their willingness to write critically of the opinions of
their colleagues. Thus, we treat dissenting activity as a possible proxy for independence.
However, as Panel B of Table 4 shows, no significant differences exist in the
Independence score of active dissenters compared with occasional dissenters for judges
of any of the four selection systems.
Third, we consider the possibility that the different systems might have different
effects on judges of varying political preferences. The bottom of Panel B shows that
judges who make political contributions (Open Secrets = 1) tend to be less independent
for the more partisan selection systems compared with judges who did not make any
political contributions (Open Secrets = 0).
The bottom line is that appointed judges are not, overall, more independent than
judges in partisan elected systems; they might even be less independent. We do find that,
among judges who contribute to political campaigns, appointed judges are more
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independent, but it is not clear that this signifies greater overall independence for the
appointment system.

4.

Multivariate Tests
We estimate a number of multivariate regression models to assess the relationship

of several key independent variables, including the judicial selection mechanism, and our
measures of judicial quality (used as the dependent variables in our models). We also
include a number of common control variables in our models.

4.1

Selection Mechanisms
Our main interest is the relationship between the selection mechanism used by

states to select and retain judges and our dependent variable measures of judicial
productivity, quality, and independence. Table 1 describes the selection systems for the
different states. In all the states, the selection mechanism long predates our data pool, and
thus we need not worry about endogeneity—that states adopted new mechanisms in
response to changes in judicial quality. Electoral systems can be traced back to the
Jacksonian era. As we mentioned above, the switch to alternative systems generally
occurred during the Progressive Era, and the process was more or less complete by the
1970s. More recent changes, with the exception of South Carolina, have been marginal
(Hanssen 1999, Besley and Payne 2006, table 1).
To check for robustness, we also test the importance of judicial tenure data—the
average tenure (meaning actual service, not de jure term length) of high court judges by
state, as of the spring of 1997 (from Hanssen 1999, tble. 1) (Tenure). Note that the
Tenure data does not come from our data set: we do not have information on the tenure of

22

the judges, many of whom are still in office. We provide summary statistics on the
relationship between Tenure and the different judge selection mechanisms in Table 5.
<<Insert Table 5 About Here>>
Note from Table 5 that mean tenure rises as partisanship falls. We have two
clusters—high partisanship and low tenure, and low partisanship and high tenure.
The advantage of the Tenure variable is that it allows us to compare the different
selection mechanisms along a common metric: the length of time that a judge expects to
remain in office. Only a few appointment states have lifetime tenure, so even the
relatively apolitical mechanisms permit judges to be “punished”: elected officials or
commissions unhappy with the performance of judges can refuse to reappoint them or
support their reappointment. Thus, tenure indicates the vulnerability of the judge to later
retention decisions more directly than do the selection mechanisms. Judges with longer
tenure face less retention pressure while judges with shorter tenure face greater retention
pressure. Tenure allows us to measure the real effects of the retention mechanisms while
allowing us to rely less on de jure rules that might be evaded in local legal practice.
However, problems exist with the Tenure variable. If a judge does a bad job from
the perspective of the decisionmaker for the retention decision, the judge may be
sanctioned, in which case she ends up with a short tenure. Judges in equilibrium may
respond to the threat of a frequent retention decision by catering to the preferences of the
retention decisionmaker. Thus a judge with a long tenure could represent either a judge
who rarely faces a retention decision or, alternatively, a judge who does face frequent
retention decisions but who in equilibrium is adept at satisfying the preferences of the
retention decisionmaker. The strong correlation between Tenure and state selection
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systems that provide for longer (if not lifetime) tenure leads us to discount this latter
possibility. Because of these potential problems with Tenure, we use Tenure only as a
robustness check of our selection system results.

4.2

Control Variables
Our multivariate models of judicial productivity, quality, and independence

include a common set of control variables. First, we include state level controls that
attempt to capture differences among states that might account for judicial performance.
Many of our state level controls relate to the state court system. We include measures for
the average high court associate justice salary (Adjusted Associate Justice Salary) and the
average partner salary in the state (Adjusted Partner Salary). The salary variables are
adjusted for the cost of living for the metro area in which the high court is located in the
state. Higher-paying states may attract higher-quality judges. Perhaps judges work harder
if their salary will decline (or not rise much) if they are not retained. We include an
indicator variable for whether the judges on the high court remained the same throughout
our sample time period from 1998 to 2000 (Stable Court) and the size of the bench during
the 1998 to 2000 period (Number of Active Judges on Bench). As a measure of resources
available to high court judges, we include the average number of clerks per judge for the
1998 to 2000 period (Number of Clerks Per Judge) and an indicator variable for whether
the clerks are tenured for at least one year (Long-Term Clerk). Judges may also act
differently if facing a high workload, particularly if an intermediate appellate level court
does not exist to help with the workload. We include the log of the number of trial cases
in the state measured in 1998 (ln(Number of Trial Cases in the State)) and an indicator
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variable for the presence of an intermediate appellate court (Intermediate Appellate
Court).11 The variables for the number of clerks and clerk tenure, the size of the bench,
the number of trial cases, and the existence of an intermediate appellate court may all
influence a judge’s choice to devote time to any specific case.
Our state-level controls also include variables relating to the general
characteristics of each state. Differences in overall state population (ln(Population)),
gross state product (ln(Gross State Product)), and crime rates (Crime Rate) may lead to
different mixes of cases and judicial responses to these cases. Because previous research
suggests that state judges are influenced by judges in neighboring states (Harris 1985),
and because larger neighboring states might produce different types of cases, we include
a variable for the aggregate population of border states (ln(Border Population)). We also
include a measure of the age of the state (State Age). Older states have longer judicial
traditions and hence possibly a more sophisticated jurisprudence on which modern judges
can draw. State Age controls for the possibility that modern judges are cited more often
outside of the state just because they can draw on the older and more sophisticated
jurisprudence of their particular state. Finally, we include a variable for citizen ideology
based on election results in each district (from Berry et al. 1998) (Citizen Ideology
Score). The background ideology of the citizens of a state may affect the preferences of
high court judges.

11

We also ran the regressions with a control variable for the ratio of cases resulting from mandatory appeal
to the total number of cases (mandatory and discretionary), to try to control for the possibility that a court’s
ability to control its docket affects productivity and other dependent variables (Brace and Hall 1990).
Another possible approach would have been to code for de jure rules governing appeals but these turn out
to be extremely complicated and we could not determine an objective way to code them. We do not report
the first regressions because of lack of confidence in the appropriateness of this control variable; in any
event, it did not affect the statistical significance or (except trivially) the size of the coefficients for our
main results, with a single small exception: in the independence regressions, the interaction of dissents and
partisan elected judges loses its statistical significance.
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Second, the multivariate models include judge level controls. We include an
indicator variable for whether the judge was the chief judge of the high court (Chief
Judge). A judge who is chief judge may have less time to author opinions. The chief
judge may also command greater respect and receive greater numbers of citations as a
result for her opinions. Alternatively, the chief may be able to assign herself the more
important opinions and garner more citations that way (Langer 2003). We include the
number of years between 1998 and the year in which the judge received her law degree
(Post Law-School Experience) and the number of years the judge has been on the high
court (Court Experience). More experienced judges may decide opinions with greater
skill, leading to more citations. A variable for whether a judge retired in 2001 or earlier
captures the possibility of end game problems (Retirement Close)—judges who retire
soon have little to lose from deciding badly.

4.3

Productivity
Our first multivariate model focuses on judicial productivity. We estimate the

following equation on judge year-level data using an ordinary least squares regression
with robust standard errors:
ln(Total_Opinions)i = α + ß1iElection_Non-Partisan + ß2iElection_Partisan
+ ß3iMerit_Plan + 3ßjiState Controlsji + 3ßkiJudge Controlski
+ Year Effects + εi
Our model relates the log of the total number of opinions authored by a judge in
any given year to three indicator variables for Non-Partisan Election, Partisan Election,
and Merit Plan states. The three indicator variables use Appointed states as the baseline.
The regression model includes year-level State Controls and Judge Controls described

26

above (see Appendix for definitions). The model also includes year fixed effects. Table 6
reports results.
<<Insert Table 6 About Here>>
The results in Model 1 of Table 6 contradict the hypothesis that judges subject to
more partisan pressure are less productive; the opposite is the case. The coefficients on
Election Non-Partisan, Election Partisan, and Merit Plan are all positive and significant at
the <1% level. Partisan-elected judges are the most productive, followed by merit-plan
and non-partisan judges. Appointed judges (the omitted, baseline case) are the least
productive.
Our control variables largely make sense and are interesting in their own right.
More highly paid judges are more productive, taking into account the opportunity cost of
forgoing a practicing lawyer’s salary—though the magnitude is small. Judges on a stable
court are more productive, probably because collegial norms are stronger on stable
courts. Chief judges are less productive, perhaps because they have administrative duties.
Judges with more judicial and legal experience are more productive; but judges become
less productive as they approach retirement. Judges from states with a large population
are more productive because they have more cases to decide, and, because of the greater
activity and diversity of the population, more law to make. The presence of an
intermediate appellate court, the number of trial cases in the state, and crime variables are
either statistically insignificant or small.12
12

As a robustness test, we re-estimate Model 1 of Table 6 using the log of the total number of majority
opinions in any given year and, alternatively, the log of the total pages written for all opinions in any given
year as dependent variables. Unreported, we obtain the same qualitative results as in Model 1 in both
robustness models. Judges from Election Non-Partisan, Election Partisan, and Merit Plan states are more
productive than Appointed judges (whether measured by total majority opinions or total pages written). We
also re-estimate Model 1 with the addition of an indicator variable set equal to 1 if the judge was in an
election year and 0 otherwise (Election Year). Unreported, the re-estimated model provides the same
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We replace the three indicator variables for the state judge selection system with
Tenure, our alternative measure of the pressure facing judges, focusing on the retention
decision. Model 2 reports that the coefficient on Tenure is negative and significant at the
<1% level. Judges who face frequent retention decisions (and presumably experience a
shorter expected tenure), are significantly more productive than judges who have the
luxury of a longer expected tenure period. These results are consistent with the Model 1
results.
Why are judges subject to electoral pressures more productive? Perhaps
productivity is used by voters as a signal of judicial competence, or by intermediaries,
such as newspaper editorialists, bar associations, and parties. Judges who write few
opinions, then, will be vulnerable in reelection campaigns.13 This would also explain why
productivity declines as retirement nears (Retirement Close), as reported in both Models
1 and 2.14
If elected judges respond to electoral pressures through increased productivity,
one might predict that productivity would increase with political competition. To test this
hypothesis, we use a standard measure in the political science literature. This measure
takes a higher value when elected officials are more frequently replaced. To Models 1
qualitative results as in Model 1; the coefficient on Election Year is negative (indicating decreased
productivity) but not statistically significant.
13
Anecdotal evidence supports the hypothesis that elected judges feel pressure to be productive.
Productivity is mentioned in newspaper endorsements and judicial evaluation materials from time to time.
A clear example can be found in the reelection campaign materials of a Texas intermediate appellate court
judge, which include a table with productivity statistics for a group of judges:
For the fiscal year ending August 31, 2006, Third Court of Appeals Justice Bob
Pemberton ranked #1 statewide among Texas’ court of appeals judges in production of
original appellate opinions on the merits. These results show that Justice Pemberton is the
most productive appeals judge in Texas for original opinions and the Third Court of
Appeals is the most productive of Texas’ 14 courts of appeals.
http://www.bobpemberton.com/2006/09/20/appeals_opinion_productivity/.
14
We also ran the regressions using total pages written by a judge for a specific year as the dependent
variable: the results were nearly the same, in most cases with somewhat higher coefficients and higher
levels of statistical significance.
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and 2 of Table 6 we add an indicator variable, High Political Competition, for states
where the level of political competition is greater than the median level. We also add
interaction terms between High Political Competition and the three indicator variables for
the state judge selection system (Model 1) and Tenure (Model 2). Table 7 reports our
results.
<<Insert Table 7 About Here>>
Model 1 of Table 7 reports that the coefficient on High Political Competition is
positive and significant at the <1% level. In contrast, the coefficients on the interaction
terms between High Political Competition and Election Non-Partisan and Election
Partisan are negative and significant at the <1% level. Moreover, the sums of High
Political Competition + Election Non-Partisan x High Political Competition and High
Political Competition + Election Partisan x High Political Competition are both negative
and significant at the 5% and <1% levels respectively. While judges from Election NonPartisan and Election Partisan states are generally more productive, the amount of
increased productivity diminishes in states with a large amount of political competition
(but still remains positive compared with judges from Appointed states).15 Model 2 of
Table 7, in contrast, reports no significant relationship between the level of productivity
and High Political Competition interacted with Tenure. These results are puzzling, and
suggest that the political competition measure is either not accurate or (more likely) does
not reflect the pressures on judges per se.

15

The sums of Election Non-Partisan + High Political Competition + Election Non-Partisan x High
Political Competition and Election Partisan + High Political Competition + Election Partisan x High
Political Competition are both positive and significant at the <1% levels.
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4.4

Citations
For outside citations, we estimate the following equation for each majority

opinion using ordinary least squares and robust standard errors:
ln(Outside State Citationsi) = α + ß1iElection_Non-Partisan + ß2iElection_Partisan
+ ß3iMerit_Plan + ß4iNumber Dissents + ß5iWest Key Pages
+ ß6iOpinion Length + 3ßjiSubject Matterji
+ 3ßkiState Controlski + 3ßliJudge Controlsli
+ Year Effects + εi
The model relates the number of outside state citations (Outside State Citations)
for any specific majority opinion with three indicator variables for Election Non-Partisan,
Election Partisan, and Merit Plan states. The three indicator variables use Appointed
states as the baseline. The model includes the number of dissents written against the
majority opinion in question (Number of Dissents). A majority opinion with one or more
dissents may deal with more novel issues of law and generate more citations as a result.
The model includes the number of west key pages (West Key Pages) as a rough measure
of the legal importance of the opinion. Similarly the model includes the length of the
opinion (Opinion Length); longer opinions are more likely to contain analysis that other
judges may cite compared with shorter opinions, all other things being equal. We also
include subject matter fixed effects for twelve different subject matter categories,
including Administrative, Attorney and Client, Capital Punishment, Church and State,
Commercial, Criminal, Family, First Amendment, Labor, Property, Rights, and Torts. We
use Other opinions as the baseline subject matter category.
We include both State Controls and Judge Controls, as described above, in the
model. For the judge controls, instead of the Retirement Close indicator variable, we
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include a series of indictor variables for whether retirement occurred prior to 2000 or in
2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, or 2005. Because the number of outside citations may drop after
a judge retires, we use these indicator variables to capture more precisely when a judge
retires. We also use year fixed effects. Table 8 reports the results from our multivariate
outside citation model.
<<Insert Table 8 About Here>>
Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that judges subject to less partisan
pressure write higher quality—more frequently cited—opinions. Model 1 reports that the
coefficients on Election Non-Partisan, Election Partisan, and Merit Plan are negative and
significant at the <1%, 5%, and <1% level respectively. Model 1 is consistent with the
view that appointed judges write the best opinions. Also, majority opinions with dissents
are cited more frequently, perhaps because the majority opinion makes new law. This
reason might also explain why longer opinions are cited more often. Finally, commercial,
torts, family law, and rights opinions stand out as those that are cited most frequently out
of state; administrative law and capital punishment decisions are cited the least out of
state. We do not have an explanation for this pattern.
Why would appointed judges write better opinions than elected judges? One
possibility is that the quality of an opinion, unlike the number of opinions written, is not
observable to the public, so elected judges do not have a strong incentive to write highquality opinions. With less pressure to produce, appointed judges might prefer to advance
their influence and professional reputation by writing good opinions. Another possibility
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is that a system that selects for judges skilled at electioneering and politicking does not
also necessarily select for judges skilled at authoring high quality legal opinions.16
To test the importance of high levels of in-state political competition, we add to
Model 1 the High Political Competition variable as well as interaction terms between
High Political Competition and the three indicator variables for the state judge selection
system. Model 2 reports that the coefficient on Election Non-Partisan x High Political
Competition is positive and significant at the <1% level. Greater political competition instate correlates with increased quality opinions for Election Non-Partisan judges. This
result is somewhat puzzling. On the other hand, the sum of Election Non-Partisan + High
Political Competition + Election Non-Partisan x High Political Competition is not
significantly different from zero. As well, the interaction term between High Political
Competition and Election Partisan is not significantly different from zero—indicating
that judges from Election Partisan states, unlike for Election Non-Partisan states, do not
respond to increased political competition with higher quality opinions.
We replace the three indicator variables for the state judge selection system with
Tenure, our alternative measure of the pressure facing judges, focusing on the retention
decision. Model 3 reports that the coefficient on Tenure is positive but not significantly
different from zero. On the other hand, the coefficient on High Political Competition is
positive and significant at the 5% level. Greater levels of political competition correlate

16

As a robustness test, we re-estimate Model 1 of Table 8 using the log of one plus the number of law
review citations to a majority opinion (ln(1+Law Review Citations)) as an alternative measure of opinion
quality. Not reported, we obtain the same qualitative results as in Model 1. Judges from Election Partisan,
Election Non-Partisan, and Merit Plan states produce opinions that are cited less by law reviews than
judges from Appointed states. Moreover, the biggest drop off in the level of law review citations is for
Election Non-Partisan opinions. We also re-estimate Model 1 with the addition of the Election Year
indicator variable. Unreported, the re-estimated model provides the same qualitative results as in Model 1;
the coefficient on Election Year is negative (indicating decreased opinion quality in an election year) but
not statistically significant.

32

with higher opinion quality. Perhaps because judges in election states where there is more
political competition do not compete as much based on productivity (but instead compete
along other dimensions), they have more time to craft higher quality opinions.

4.5

Independence

4.5.1

Propensity to Dissent
To assess what factors correlate with a high propensity to write dissenting

opinions, we estimate the following equation on judge-year level data using ordinary
least squares and robust standard errors:

ln(1+Number Dissenting Opinions)i = α + ß1iElection_Non-Partisan
+ ß2iElection_Partisan + ß3iMerit_Plan + 3ßjiState Controlsji
+ 3ßkiJudge Controlski + Year Effects + εi
The regression model relates the number of dissenting opinions written in a given
year (ln(1+Number Dissenting Opinions)) with three indicator variables for Non-Partisan
Election, Partisan Election, and Merit Plan states. The indicator variables use Appointed
states as the baseline. The model includes year-level versions of the state controls and
judge controls as well as year fixed effects. Table 9 reports the model.
<<Insert Table 9 About Here>>
Model 1 of Table 9 indicates that elected judges, especially partisan-elected
judges, dissent the most, with merit-plan judges in the middle. Appointed judges write the
fewest dissenting opinions. If dissenting indicates independence, than elected judges are
more independent than appointed judges are.
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Model 1 of Table 9 also reports, however, that the presence of high political
competition among elected officials in the state (High Political Competition) reduces the
propensity to dissent for the judges in elected judge states. Note that the coefficients on
the interaction terms between High Political Competition and Election Non-Partisan and
Election Partisan are both negative and significant at the 10% and <1% levels
respectively. The behavior of judges with respect to writing dissents in Election states is
not independent of politics. Judges in states with a large amount of political competition,
for example, may choose not to write as many dissents to avoid providing opponents with
political targets. Such judges may instead use dissents without opinions to display their
party loyalty while keeping their political profile low. By contrast, appointed judges are
not affected by political competition at a statistically significant level.
Model 2 of Table 9 reports the results of our robustness test using Tenure as an
alternative specification of how judges differ across the states with a focus on the
retention decision. Note that the coefficient on Tenure in Model 2 is negative and
significant at the <1% level. Judges who face the possibility of a short tenure (as in
elected states) write more dissents. Similarly, the coefficient on High Political
Competition is negative and significant at the <1% level and the coefficient on the
interaction term between Tenure and High Political Competition is positive and
significant at the <1% level (indicating that judges who face more frequent retention
decisions are more affected by High Political Competition to reduce the number of
dissenting opinions). More political competition in the state might cause judges who
otherwise would compete based on writing dissenting opinions to focus on other aspects
of competition.
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As a robustness test, we re-estimate Models 1 and 2 of Table 9 with the addition
of the Election Year indicator variable. Unreported, the re-estimated model provides the
same qualitative results as in Models 1 and 2; the coefficients on Election Year are
negative (indicating decreased productivity) but not statistically significant.
If dissenting indicates a willingness to express one’s honest view, then our results
suggest that elected judges are more likely to do this when political competition is low,
while appointed judges are less deterred from dissenting when political competition is
high. 17 But overall, elected judges are more willing to dissent than appointed judges are,
so if dissenting signifies independence, then elected judges are more independent than
appointed judges are.

4.5.2

Propensity to Write Opinions Against Co-Partisans (Independence)
Given the shortcomings of focusing solely on the number of dissenting opinions

as a measure of independence, we turn to our Independence measure. We estimate the
following equation on pooled data from 1998 to 2000 using an ordinary least squares
regression model with robust standard errors:

Independencei = α + ß1iElection_Non-Partisan + ß2iElection_Partisan
+ ß3iMerit_Plan + 3ßjiSubject Matterji
+ 3ßkiState Controlski + 3ßliJudge Controlsli + εi
The regression model relates our Independence measure (Independence) based on
pooled 1998 to 2000 data for each judge with three indicator variables for Non-Partisan
Election, Partisan Election, and Merit Plan states. The three variables use Appointed

17

We also find a positive correlation between dissent activity and the size of the bench (that is, the number
of judges participating in cases during our period), which is consistent with Lindquist (2007), who finds the
same result using federal appellate courts).
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states as the baseline. The model includes pooled data version of the state controls and
judge controls as described above. As a control for the subject matter composition of the
pool of opinions, for each of the 12 subject matter categories (see Appendix for
definitions) we compute the number of majority opinions that deal with the specific
subject matter divided by the total number of majority opinions for the state in the 1998
to 2000 time period. We include this ratio for each subject matter in the model as pooled
controls for subject matter in the state. Table 10 reports the results of our model.
<<Insert Table 10 About Here>>
Model 1 of Table 10 reports that none of the coefficients on the three indicator
variables for the state judge selection systems are significantly different from zero. The
coefficient on Number of Dissenting Opinions is, however, positive and significant at the
5% level. Those judges who write more dissents are also more independent under our
Independence measure. In contrast, the coefficient on the interaction term between
Number of Dissenting Opinions and Election Partisan is negative and significant at the
<1% level. While judges who write more dissenting opinions generally receive a higher
Independence score, this relationship does not hold true for judges in Election Partisan
states.
We posit that more ideologically intense judges will tend to act less independently
when faced with the possibility of an election. To test this, we add the Open Secrets
measure of political contribution as a proxy for political intensity to Model 1. We also
add interaction terms between Open Secrets and the three indicator variables for the state
selection systems. Model 2 reports that the interaction terms between Open Secrets and
Election Non-Partisan and Election Partisan are both negative (indicating less
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independence) and significant at the 5% and <1% levels respectively. While more
intensely political judges do not correlate significantly with a decreased independence
score for Appointed and Merit Plan judges, we do see a negative relationship between
political intensity and independence for the elected judges.
We lastly posit that elected judges from states with a high level of political
competition will act differently than appointed judges with similarly high levels of
political competition. We add the High Political Competition indicator variable to Model
2 as wells as interaction terms between High Political Contribution and the three
indicator variables for the state judge selection system and report the results in Model 3
of Table 10. From Model 3 note that the coefficient on the interaction term between
Partisan Election and High Political Competition is positive and significant at the 5%
level while the coefficients on all the other High Political Competition variables are
insignificant. While Partisan Election state judges do display a difference in behavior
depending on the underlying state political environment (in a way that Appointed and
Merit Plan judges do not), we are not sure of why the level of Independence increases for
Partisan Election judges in High Political Competition states. Perhaps elected judges in
High Political Competition states compete other than through their opinions (and thus act
less partisan in the decisions themselves).18

18

As a robustness test, we re-estimate Model 3 using Independence_Indicator as the dependent variable, set
equal to 1 if Independence is greater or equal to 0 and set equal to 0 otherwise. Unreported, we obtain
qualititatively similar results with some differences. The coefficient on Election Non-Partisan is now
positive and significant at the 5% level, indicating the judges from Election Non-Partisan states are
generally more independent under this measure than Appointed judges. On the other hand, the interaction
terms between Election Non-Partisan and the Number of Dissenting Opinions and Open Secrets remain
negative (and are significant at the 10% level), indicating that elected judges who write more dissents and
are politically more active are less independent. Moreover, the coefficients on the High Political
Competition variables are now all insignificant.
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Our results are complicated and difficult to summarize but our overall sense is
that elected judges are more sensitive to political competition than appointed judges are
(suggesting that elected judges are less independent) but that elected judges are more
likely to dissent (suggesting more independence), and that the two types of judges are
otherwise roughly equally like to write against co-partisans (suggesting equal
independence). Strongly partisan judges act in a more partisan way in electoral systems
than in appointment systems, but it is not clear why this matters if independence for
overall judicial activity is the same. Perhaps the clearest conclusion is that the
conventional wisdom that appointed judges are more independent than elected judges is a
simplification and probably an exaggeration.

4.6

Productivity Versus Quality
Given the ambiguity of our independence results, what’s more important:

productivity or quality? As a measure of the overall influence of a judge’s opinions, we
calculated the aggregate number of outside citations to the opinions written by each judge
in one year (Aggregate Outside Citations). The average judge in a partisan election
system in one year writes opinions cited (outside of the state and home federal circuit) in
the aggregate 11.3 times, whereas the average judge in an appointment system writes
opinions cited in the aggregate 15.0 times (difference significant at the <1% level). The
numbers for non-partisan election systems and merit selection systems are 11.3 and 14.0,
respectively. At a summary statistic level, the influence of appointed judges is not
significantly diminished relative to elected judges despite the lower productivity on the
part of appointed judges.
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To provide a multivariate test controlling for state and judge characteristics, we
re-estimate our judge productivity model (Model 1 of Table 6) on judge-year level data,
replacing ln(Total Opinions) with ln(Aggregate Outside Citations) as the dependent
variable. Unreported, the coefficients on Election Partisan, Election Non-Partisan and
Merit are all positive and significant at <1%, 5%, and 10% respectively, using Appointed
as the base case. Judges from partisan election states in particular correlate with
significantly higher levels of aggregate outside citations compared with appointed judges.
In contrast with the summary statistic comparison, the multivariate test is consistent with
the view that the lack of productivity on the part of appointed judges diminishes the
overall influence and quality of their total judicial output of opinions.
We note parenthetically that the quality-quantity tradeoff—that judges apparently
write more opinions that are of lower quality, or fewer opinions of higher quality—is
itself of intrinsic interest, and seems highly plausible, yet has not been noticed in the
literature.

5.

Explaining the Results
We summarize our results in Table 11.

<<Insert Table 11 About Here>>

Elected judges write more opinions and while their average cite counts per
opinion are lower than those for appointed judges, they garner more citations overall.
From the average litigant’s perspective, elected judges provide more justice to more
people—if one takes the receipt of a written explanation for the court’s decision as a
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component of justice. Appointed judges write fewer opinions, but those that are written
tend to be higher quality opinions—they garner more citations. Fewer litigants are
receiving this high quality justice though. Judges in the different systems exhibit similar
levels of independence. What explains this?
One explanation draws on differences in incentives to write opinions. The
multitasking model (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991), shows that if an agent is given two
objectives (say, quality and productivity), and the activities that further only one of those
objectives can be measured and monitored by the principal, then the agent will shirk on
the hard-to-measure objective and invest in achieving the other.
Judges in more partisan systems may write more opinions because raw
productivity is observable. Judges who write few opinions, for example, can be easily
criticized and, as we have seen, some judges use productivity as a campaign issue.
Quality is hard to observe. So, judges who are concerned about retention will shirk on
quality, while judges with security have no such incentive. Absent political pressure, the
latter set of judges might concern themselves more with their long-term reputation among
judicial colleagues and lawyers.
As for independence, the propensity to vote with or against co-partisans is also
hard to observe. If so, elected judges would have no more incentive to refrain from acting
independently than appointed judges do. So it is, in the end, not surprising that the
independence levels of elected and appointed judges are not clearly different.
A problem with the multitasking theory is our finding that elected judges write
fewer opinions as political competition increases. Perhaps they need to spend more time
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campaigning or forging political connections. In any event, they must think that the
productivity loss does not hurt them, or not much.
But this problem also suggests that another interpretation of the data might be
superior. This brings us to selection. It might be that the different systems attract different
types of people to judgeships: selection matters more than incentives to behave once in
office. In particular, electoral systems would seem to attract politicians, while
appointment systems are more likely to attract professionals. Politicians want to satisfy
the voting public, and this might mean deciding cases expeditiously and in great number.
Professionals are more concerned about their reputation among other lawyers and judges,
and are more interested in delivering well-crafted opinions that these others will admire.
To test this possibility, we compare judges from different selection systems. We
chose characteristics that might explain the differences in judicial behavior.
<<Insert Table 12 About Here>>
The most striking differences are as follows. Compared with Appointed judges,
Elected judges make more campaign contributions; are paid less; are on less stable
benches; have shorter tenures; are more likely to have gone to a law school in the state in
which they sit; and are more likely to have gone to a lower-rank law school. They are, in
short, more politically involved, more locally connected, more temporary, and less welleducated than appointed judges. They are more like politicians and less like
professionals. Elected judges also have less court experience, but the difference with
Appointed judges is not statistically significant.
One might think that politicians would be more concerned about party
identification, and hence would be more likely to vote together than professionals are—
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but this is not the case, as our independence measures show. One simple explanation for
our results is that for most cases, one’s vote has no political salience. The vast majority of
cases are unanimous. It is more important even for politician-judges to decide many cases
correctly than to agree with their co-partisans. Political identification matters as a proxy
for how one’s view affects how one evaluates a case. That is why judges do tend to vote
with co-partisans. But this general tendency does not produce different independence
outcomes in electoral and appointment systems because independence for all but a tiny
number of cases is unobservable (and therefore not a focus of judges under either type of
selection system).
The selection argument is more appealing than the incentives/multitasking
argument because so much of judicial behavior is hard to observe. Judges may well
believe that, as long as they avoid extremes of behavior, they can count on being
reelected or reappointed. Ordinary people elect hard-working locals, while governors
appoint reliable professionals who will not embarrass them.
In sum, a simple explanation for our results is that electoral judgeships attract and
reward politically savvy people, while appointed judgeships attract more professionally
able people. However, the politically savvy people might give the public what it wants—
adequate rather than great opinions, issued in greater quantity and therefore (given the
time constraint) average speed.

6.

Conclusion
We began this project with the assumption that the data would demonstrate that

appointed judges are better than elected judges. Our results persuade us that the story is
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more complicated. It may be that elected judges are, indeed, superior to appointed judges.
At a minimum, the conventional wisdom needs to be reexamined.
A full comparative evaluation of the systems would require more research. In
particular, there has been much concern in recent years about the rise in the cost of
election campaigns for supreme court justices, and some evidence that supreme court
justices are more likely to vote in favor of contributors and their interests (Liptak and
Roberts 2006, Goldberg et al. 2006).19 However, by the same token campaign
expenditures enhance public awareness and indicate that judges face real political
competition, which, for reasons we have given, might be a good rather than bad thing. In
addition, one needs to take account of the hidden costs of appointment systems, namely,
that they can serve patronage purposes.

19

Goldberg et al. (2006) identify Alabama, Illinois, Michigan, and Ohio as outliers—states where
campaign contributions were much greater than in other states—as of 2000, the last year of our study. We
checked the independence scores of judges in these states and found Alabama and Michigan had lower
mean independence scores than the mean for all states, while Illinois and Ohio had higher scores. This is an
interesting topic for future research, but as of now the data do not seem reliable and accessible enough to
do a rigorous test.

43

References
Abramowicz, Michael, and Emerson Tiller. 2005. “Judicial Citation of Legislative History:
Contextual Theory and Empirical Analysis,”
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=725919.
Aspin, Larry. 1999. “Trends in Judicial Retention Elections,” 83 Judicature 81.
Baker, Scott. 2007. “Should we Pay Federal Circuit Judges More?,” unpub. m.s., available at:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=998395.
Berry, William D., Evan J. Ringquist, and Richard C. Fording, Russell L. Hanson. 1998.
“Measuring Citizen and Government Ideology in the American States, 1960–93,” 42
American Journal of Political Science 327-348; updated data available from
http://www.uky.edu/%7Erford/Home_files/page0005.htm.
Besley, Timothy, and Abigail Payne. 2005. “Implementation of Anti-Discrimination Policy: Does
Judicial Discretion Matter?,” CEPR Discussion Paper 5211, available at:
http://www.cepr.org/PUBS/NEWDPS/dplist.asp?dpno=5211&action.x=0&action.y=0&action=ShowDP.
Bhattacharya, Mita, and Russell Smyth. 2001. “The Determinants of Judicial Prestige and
Influence: Some Empirical Evidence From the High Court of Australia,” 30 Journal of
Legal Studies 223.
Bibby, John F. and Thomas M. Holbrook. 1999. “Parties and Elections,” in Virginia Gray, Russel
Hanson, and Herbert Jacob, eds., Politics in the American States. Washington, D.C.:
Congressional Quarterly Books.
Bickel, Alexander M. 1986. The Least Dangerous Branch. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University
Press.
Brace, Paul and Melinda Gann Hall. 1990. Neo-Institutionalism and Dissent in State Supreme
Courts, 52 Journal of Politics 54
Brace, Paul and Melinda Gann Hall. 1995. “Studying Courts Comparatively: The View from the
American States,” 48 Political Research Quarterly 5–29.
Brace, Paul, Laura Langer, and Melinda Gann Hall. 2000. “Measuring the Preferences of State
Supreme Court Judges,” 62 Journal of Politics 387– 413.
Brace, Paul, Melinda Gann Hall and Laura Langer. 2001. “Placing State Supreme Courts in State
Politics,” 1 State Politics and Policy Quarterly 81–108.
Brace, Paul, Jeff Yates, and Brent D. Boyea. 2006. “The Conditional Effects of Ideology and
Institutional Structure on Judicial Voting in State Supreme Courts” ExpressO Preprint
Series Working Paper 1831, http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/1831.
Cann, Damon. 2007. “Beyond Accountability and Independence: Judicial Selection and State
Court Performance,” 90 Judicature 226.

44

Canon, Bradley. 1972. “The Impact of Formal Selection Processes on the Characteristics of
Judges – Reconsidered,” 6 Law & Society Review 579.
Carrington, Paul D. 1998. Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountability in Highest State
Courts, 61 Law and Contemporary Problems 79.
Choi, Stephen J., and G. Mitu Gulati. 2004. “Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice: An
Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance,” 78 Southern California Law Review 23.
Choi, Stephen J. and G. Mitu Gulati. Forthcoming. “Bias in Judicial Citations: A New Window
into the Behavior of Judges,” Journal of Legal Studies.
Croley, Steven P. 1995. “The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law,”
62 University of Chicago Law Review 689–94.
Cross, Frank B. 2005. “Legal Process, Legal Realism, and the Strategic Political Effects of
Procedural Rules,” unpub. m.s., available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=837665.
Cross, Frank, and Stefanie Lindquist. 2006. “Judging the Judges,” unpublished draft.
Cross, Frank and Emerson H. Tiller. 1998. “Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal
Doctrine: Whistle-blowing on the Federal Court of Appeals,” 107 Yale Law Journal
2155–76.
Dam, Kenneth W. 2006. The Law-Growth Nexus: The Rule of Law and Economic Development.
Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press.
Dudley, Robert L. 1997. “Turnover and Tenure on State High Courts: Does Method of Selection
Make a Difference?,” 19 The Justice System Journal 1.
George, Tracey E. 1998. “Developing a Positive Theory of Decision Making on the U.S. Court of
Appeals,” 58 Ohio State Law Journal 1635.
Geyh, Charles G. 2003. “Why Judicial Elections Stink,” 64 Ohio State Law Journal 43.
Glick, Henry and Craig Emmert. 1987. “Selection Systems and Judicial Characteristics: The
Recruitment of State Supreme Court Justices,” 70 Judicature 228.
Goldberg, Deborah, Craig Holman, and Samantha Sanchez. 2006. The New Politics of Judicial
Elections. Brennan Center.
Hall, Melinda Gann. 2001. “State Supreme Courts in American Democracy: Probing the Myths of
Judicial Reform,” 95 American Political Science Review 315.
Hanssen, F. Andrew. 1999. “The Effect of Judicial Institutions on Uncertainty and the Rate of
Litigation: The Election versus Appointment of State Judges,” 28 Journal of Legal
Studies 205–32.
Hanssen, F. Andrew. 2000. “Independent Courts and Administrative Agencies: An Empirical
Analysis of the States,’’ 16 Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 534–71.

45

Hanssen, F. Andrew. 2002. “On the Politics of Judicial Selection: Lawyers and the State
Campaigns for the Merit Plan,” 110 Public Choice 79-97.
Hanssen, F. Andrew. 2004. “Learning About Judicial Independence: Institutional Change in the
State Courts,” 33 Journal of Legal Studies 431.
Harris, Peter. 1986. “Ecology and Culture in the Communication of Precedent Among State
Supreme Courts, 1870-1970,” 19 Law & Society Review 449.
Helland, Eric and Alex Tabarrok. 2002. “The Effect of Electoral Institutions on Tort Awards,” 4
American Law and Economics Review 341–70.
Hirschl, Ran. 2004. Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New
Constitutionalism. Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press.
Holmes, Stephen. 1988. “Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy,” in Jon Elster and Rune
Slagstad, eds., Constitutionalism and Democracy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press.
Holmstrom, Bengt and Milgrom, Paul, 1991. “Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive
Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design,” 7 Journal of Law, Economics and
Organization 24–52.
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio López-de-Silanes, Cristian Pop-Eleches, and Andrei Shleifer. 2004.
“Judicial Checks and Balances,” 112 Journal of Political Economy 445–70.
Landes, William M., and Richard A. Posner. 1980. “Legal Change, Judicial Behavior, and the
Diversity Jurisdiction,” 9 Journal of Legal Studies 367.
Langer, Laura. 2002. Judicial Review in State Supreme Courts: A Comparative Study. Albany:
State University of New York Press.
Langer, Laura, Jody McMullen, Nicholas P. Ray, and Daniel D. Stratton. 2003. “Recruitment of
Chief Justices on State Supreme Courts: A Choice Between Institutional and Personal
Goals,” 65 Journal of Politics 656–75.
Lindquist, Stefanie A. 2007. “Bureaucratization and Balkanization: The Origins and Effects of
Decision-Making Norms in the Federal Appellate Courts,” 41 University of Richmond
Law Review 659.
Liptak, Adam, and Janet Roberts. 2006. “Campaign Cash Mirrors High Court’s Rulings,” N.Y.
Times, Oct. 1, 2006, A1.
Lott, John R. 2005. “The Judicial Confirmation Process: The Difficulty with Being Smart,” 2
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 407.
Maskin, Eric, and Jean Tirole. 2004. “The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in
Government,” 94 American Economic Review 1034–54.

46

McLeod, Aman L. 2007. “Judicial Performance Review: A Balance Between Judicial
Accountability and Public Accountability,” 34 Fordham Urban Law Journal 343.
Newman, Jon O. 1984. “Between Legal Principles and Neutral Principles: The Legitimacy of
Institutional Values,” 72 California Law Review 200.
Pinello, Daniel R. 1995. The Impact of Judicial-Selection Method on State-Supreme-Court Policy:
Innovation, Reaction, and Atrophy. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
Segal, Jeffrey A. and Harold J. Spaeth. 2002. The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model
Revisited. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Shepherd, Joanna. 2007. “Finger To the Wind: The Influence of Retention Politics on Judges'
Decisions,” http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=997491.
Sunstein, Cass R., David Schkade, and Lisa M. Ellman. 2004. "Ideological Voting on Federal
Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation,” 90 Virginia Law Review 301–54.
Symposium on Rethinking Judicial Selection: A Critical Appraisal of Appointive Selection for
State Court Judges. 2007. 34 Fordham Urban Law Journal 3.
Tabarrok, Alexander, and Eric Helland. 1999. “Court Politics: The Political Economy of Tort
Awards,” 42 Journal of Law and Economics 157–88.
Tarr, G.A. 2003. “Selection of State Appellate Judges: Reform Proposals: Rethinking the
Selection of State Supreme Court Justices,” 39 Willamette Law Review 1445.

47

APPENDIX
Key Variable Definitions
Variable

Definition

Total Opinions

Total number of majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions
authored by a particular judge in one year (ranging from 1998 to
2000)

Outside State Citations

Total number of citations from federal courts outside the circuit that
includes the state in question and from courts in other states.
Citations are measured in opinions authored up until January 1, 2007
(as tracked in the LEXIS Shepard’s database).

Opposite_Party

The total number of opposing opinions written against an opposite
party judge divided by the total number of opposing opinions written
against either a judge of the opposite or same party as the judge in
question for the 1998 to 2000 time period. Opposing opinions include
dissents written against a majority opinion and majority opinions
where a dissenting opinion exists.

Opposite_Pool

Total number of majority opinions written by the high court judges of
the opposite political party (from the perspective of the judge in
question) divided by the total number of majority opinions written by
judges of both the same and opposite parties from 1998 to 2000.

Independence

Defined as Opposite_Pool minus Opposite_Party. A more negative
Independence score occurs when Opposite_Pool < Opposite Party,
indicating an increased tendency to write an opposing opinion against
an opposite party judge. Conversely, a more positive Independence
score indicates a decreased tendency to write an opposing opinion
against an opposite party judge.

Election Non-Partisan

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the state uses a non-partisan election
to select high court justices and 0 otherwise.

Election Partisan

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the state uses a partisan election to
select high court justices and 0 otherwise.

Merit Plan

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the state follows the Missouri Merit
Plan or a variant (including the Tennessee Plan) to select High Court
justices and 0 otherwise.

Tenure

The average tenure of high court judges for the state in question,
measured as of the spring of 1997 (from Hanssen 1999, tble. 1).

Political Competition

Folded Ranney index determined for 1995 to 1998 for the state in
question (from Bibby and Holbrook 1999). The folded Ranney index
ranges from 0.5-1, with higher numbers indicating greater
competitiveness.

High Political Competition

Indicator Variable equal to 1 if the state in question has a Political
Competition Score that is greater than the median for all states and 0
otherwise.
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Number of Dissents

Indicator Variable equal to 1 if the judge authoring an opinion is
Republican and 0 otherwise.

West Key Pages

Number of pages in an opinion associated with the West key pages
section (as provided in the West reporter version of the opinion and
tabulated on Westlaw).

Opinion Length

Number of pages from the start of the opinion to the end of the
opinion as provided in the West reporter version of the opinion and
tabulated on Westlaw. For majority opinions, we measured from
where the authoring judge’s actual opinion starts to the end of the
majority opinion.

Open Secrets

Indicator Variable equal to 1 if the judge authoring the opinion in
question has donated to a political candidate and 0 otherwise.
Political contributions are tracked by www.opensecrets.org and
include Federal Election Commission records of receipts from all
individuals who contribute at least $200 from 1992 to 2006.
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APPENDIX
State-Level Variable Definitions
Variable

Definition

Adjusted Associate Justice Salary

For year-level data, the associate justice salary reported in the prior
year for the state (so 1997 for 1998 judge-level data) divided by a
cost of living adjustment for the year in question measured for the
metro area in which the high court of the state is located. For pooled
data, the associate justice salary reported in 1997 divided by the cost
of living adjustment for 1998.

Adjusted Partner Salary

For year-level data, the average partner salary reported for the year in
question for the state divided by a cost of living adjustment for the
year in question measured for the metro area in which the high court
of the state is located. For pooled data, the average partner salary in
1998 divided by the cost of living adjustment for 1998.

Stable Court

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the state high court justices stayed the
same from 1998 to 2000 and 0 otherwise.

Number of Active Judges on Bench

Number of judges who were active at any time from 1998 to 2000 for
the state in question.

Long-Term Clerk

Indicator variable equal to 1 if state clerks are tenured for more than
one year and 0 if tenure is 1 year or less.

Number of Clerks Per Judge

Average number of clerks per judge in the 1998 to 2000 time period.

Number of Trial Cases in the State

Number of trial cases in the entire state in 1998.

Intermediate Appellate Court

Indicator Variable equal to 1 if the opinion is in opposition to the
opinion of another judge in the same case and 0 otherwise. In the case
of a dissenting opinion written by the judge in question, the opinion is
treated as in active opposition to the majority opinion. In the case of a
majority opinion by the judge in question, active opposition exists if
the majority opinion is opposed by a dissenting opinion.

Population

For year level data, the population of the state in millions measured in
the year prior to the year in question (so the population in 1997 if the
data year is 1998). For pooled data, the population of the state in
millions measured for 1997.

Gross State Product

Gross State Product (measured as of 1998).

Crime Index

For year level data, overall crime rate for the state (including property
and violent crime) per 100,000 population from the FBI Crime
Report for the year prior to the year in question. For pooled data, the
overall crime rate measured for 1997.

Total Population in Border States

Total population of all bordering states of the state in question
(measured as of 1997).

State Age

Age of the state. For year-level data this is defined as the difference
between the year in question and the year of admission of the state
into the United States. For pooled data, this is defined as the
difference between 1998 and the year of admission of the state into
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the United States.
Citizen Ideology Score

Measure of citizen ideology based on election results in each district,
which are then used to compute a statewide average (ultimately based
on interest group ratings of a given state's federal congressional
delegation) (from Berry et al. 1998).

Misconduct

Number of misconduct removals of judges in the state in question
from 1990-1997.

Impeached

Number of judicial impeachments in the state in question from 19901997.
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APPENDIX
Judge-Level Variable Definitions
Variable

Definition

Chief Judge

For year-level data, indicator variable equal to 1 if the judge in
question is the chief judge of the court in the year in question and 0
otherwise. For pooled data, indicator variable equal to 1 if the judge
in question is the chief judge of the court for any year from 1998 to
2000 and 0 otherwise.

Court Experience

For year-level data, the difference between the year in question and
the year the judge first joined the high court. For pooled data, the
difference between 1998 and the year the judge first joined he high
court (if the judge started on the court in 1998 or later court
experience is set to 0).

Post-Law School Experience

The difference between 1998 and the year the judge graduated law
school.

Retirement Close

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the judge in question retired from the
bench in 2001 or earlier and 0 otherwise.

USNews Rank

U.S. News Ranking of the judge’s law school (measured as of
2005).20

In-state Law School

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the judge attended a law school
located in the state in question and 0 otherwise.

20

These data were convenient; older data was either accessible or less

52

APPENDIX - continued
Subject Matter Categories
Variable

Definition

Administrative

Review of Agency/Government Decisionmaking (not in
another subject matter category). Also includes Government
Actions (e.g., State suit to comply with state statute that does
not fit in other categories); private actions suing state actors for
negligence, etc (unless the case involves prisoner rights which
is included in the “Criminal” category of cases).

Attorney and Client

Attorney Misconduct; Attorney fees (unless fits in one of
above categories); Disbarment; contempt of court order against
attorney

Capital Punishment

Capital Punishment-related actions.

Church and State

Pledge of Allegiance; Funding for Private Religious Schools;
Prayer in School; Ten Commandments

Commercial

Contracts; Insurance; Private arbitration; Creditor v. Debtor;
Lessor-Lessee; Usury Laws; Franchise v. Franchisor;
Employment Contractual Disputes; Corporate Law; Piercing
the Corporate Veil; Tax; Bankruptcy; Enforcement of
mechanics lien; Implied warrant of merchantability

Criminal

Sentencing Guidelines; Prisoners Rights; Murder; Rape;
Drugs/Controlled Substances; Attorney-Client Privilege in
Criminal Context; Grand Jury-related; Juvenile Criminals.
Excludes Capital Punishment cases.

Family

Divorce; Adoption; Child Support; Probate/Inheritance

First Amendment

Employment issues (excluding employment contractual
disputes); ERISA; National Labor Relations Board (NLRB);
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA); Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA); Wrongful Discharge; Labor
Management Relations Act (LMRA); Family and Medical
Leave Act (FMLA); Employee Benefits; Worker’s
Compensation claims; Retaliatory Discharge claims.

Labor

Employment issues (excluding (1) employment contractual
disputes that are not Workers Comp or state administrative
wage rate related—these go to “Commercial” and (2)
excluding discrimination-type claims that fit in “Civil Rights”);
ERISA; NLRB; Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA);
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA); Wrongful Discharge; Labor
Management Relations Act (LMRA); Family and Medical
Leave Act (FMLA); Employee Benefits; Worker's
Compensation claims; Retaliatory Discharge claims; State
Wage Rate Claims
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Property

Takings claims; Zoning issues; Property rights; Property
Licensing-Related or Permit-Related; Landlord-TenantRelated.

Rights

Race Discrimination; Sex Discrimination; Affirmative Action;
Civil Rights; Age Discrimination; Privacy; Handicap
Discrimination; Abortion (Includes discrimination in
employment context cases); Voting Rights-Voting Related

Torts

Federal Tort Related Act; Medical Malpractice; Products
Liability; Wrongful Death; Libel; etc.

Other

All other cases.
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Table 1
Appointed
Connecticut

Merit Selection
Alaska

Non-Partisan Election
Georgia

Partisan Election
Alabama

Delaware

Arizona

Idaho

Arkansas

Hawaii

Colorado

Kentucky

Illinois

Massachusetts

Iowa

Louisiana

Mississippi

Maine

Indiana

Michigan

North Carolina

New Hampshire

Kansas

Minnesota

New Mexico

New Jersey

Maryland

Montana

Pennsylvania

New York

Missouri

North Dakota

Texas

Rhode Island

Nebraska

Nevada

West Virginia

Vermont

Oklahoma

Ohio

South Carolina

South Dakota

Oregon

Virginia

Utah

Washington

Wyoming

Wisconsin

California
Florida
Tennessee
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Table 2: Productivity
Number of
Judge-Years

Mean
Total
Opinions Per
Year

Partisan Election

229

31.3

Mean
Majority
Opinions Per
Judge Per
Year
19.4

Mean
Dissenting
Opinions Per
Judge Per
Year
8.0

Non-Partisan Election

277

27.5

17.9

6.9

Merit Selection

336

23.6

18.1

3.7

Appointed

232

20.9

16.7

3.0

Judge-years represent yearly data for each judge in our sample. Total Opinions includes majority,
dissenting, and concurring opinions.

Table 3: Mean Citations Per Majority Opinion
Number
of
Majority
Opinions

Outside
Federal
Court

Other
State
Court

US
Supreme
Court

Outside
State
Citations

Law
Review
Citations

Partisan Election

4447

0.108

0.458

0.005

0.572

1.765

Non-Partisan Election

4952

0.103

0.603

0.007

0.712

1.856

Merit Selection

6079

0.134

0.631

0.009

0.774

1.840

Appointed

4007

0.211

0.657

0.006

0.872

2.273

Home Federal Court includes all citations from a federal district or circuit court located in the circuit that
contains the state in question. Outside Federal Court includes all citations from a federal district or circuit
court located in a circuit that does not contain the state in question. Other State Court includes all citations
from state courts outside of the state in question. US Supreme Court includes all citations from the U.S.
Supreme Court. Outside Citation is the sum of Outside Federal Court + Other State Court + US Supreme
Court. All citations are from the LEXIS Shepard’s database and are tracked up until January 1, 2007. Law
Review Citations are for law reviews as tracked by the LEXIS Shepard’s database (until January 1, 2007).
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Table 4: Independence
Panel A
Number of Judges

Mean
Independence

Independence_
Indicator
(1=Independent;
0=Partisan)

Partisan Election

83

–0.019

0.453

Non-Partisan Election

89

–0.066

0.345

Merit Selection

108

–0.030

0.433

Appointed

72

–0.027

0.435

Independence is defined as the Opposite_Party – Opposite_Pool. Opposite_Party is the number of opposing
opinions written against a judge of the opposite party divided by the number of opposing opinions written
against a judge of either the opposite or same party from 1998 to 2000. Opposite Pool is the total number of
majority opinions authored by an opposite party judge divided by the total number of majority opinions
authored by either an opposite or same party judge from 1998 to 2000. Independence_Indicator is defined
as 1 if Independence is greater or equal to zero and 0 otherwise. Only judges for whom we could identify a
political party were included in the analysis. Only judges from states that had a mixture of judges from
different political parties were included.

Panel B
Less than or Equal
to Median Number
of Authored Dissents

Greater than
Median Number of
Authored Dissents

p-value

Partisan Election

–0.021

–0.018

0.9063

Non-Partisan Election

–0.082

–0.055

0.5911

Merit Selection

–0.033

–0.025

0.7801

Appointed

–0.029

–0.023

0.9387

Open Secrets=0

Open Secrets=1

p-value

Partisan Election

0.057

–0.052

0.0001

Non-Partisan Election

–0.032

–0.115

0.0893

Merit Selection

–0.028

–0.037

0.7817

Appointed

–0.044

0.067

0.1768
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Table 5: Tenure Data

Partisan Election

Number of
States
10

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

6.8

2.4

3.5

11.1

Non–Partisan Election

13

7.0

1.5

4.6

9.1

Merit Selection

17

10.0

4.5

4

19.1

Appointed

12

9.2

3.1

5

14.9

Total

52

8.5

3.4

3.5

19.1

Tenure is defined as the average tenure of high court judges for the state in question, measured as of the
spring of 1997 (from Hanssen 1999, tble. 1).
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Table 6: Productivity
Model 1
ln(Total
Opinions)

Dependent Variable

Model 2
ln(Total
Opinions)

Independent Variables
Election Partisan

0.556**
(6.290)

Election Non-Partisan

0.478**
(5.700)

Merit Plan

0.426**
(5.050)
–0.045**
(–5.870)

Tenure
–0.173**
(–2.800)

–0.190**
(–3.030)

Court Experience

0.011*
(2.440)

0.014**
(2.950)

Post-Law School Experience

0.007*
(2.250)

0.008*
(2.430)

–0.234**
(–4.230)

–0.252**
(–4.560)

0.001**
(3.100)

0.001**
(4.750)

Chief Judge

Retirement Close
Adjusted Associate Justice Salary
Adjusted Partner Salary

0.000
(–0.910)

0.000
(–0.920)

Stable Court

0.264**
(4.120)

0.303**
(4.780)

Number of Active Judges on Bench

0.000
(0.010)

0.045
(2.530)

Long-Term Clerk

–0.134**
(–2.610)

–0.029
(–0.580)

Number of Clerks Per Judge

–0.019
(–0.430)

0.000
(0.010)

ln(Number of Trial Cases in the State)

0.010
(0.250)

–0.002
(–0.060)

Intermediate Appellate Court

0.075
(0.660)

0.097
(0.880)

ln(State Population)

0.835**
(4.420)

1.051**
(5.870)

ln(Total Population in Border States)

–0.057**

–0.046**
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(–5.080)

(–4.200)

0.000**
(–5.050)

0.000**
(–6.050)

0.005**
(5.560)

0.002**
(3.170)

ln(Gross State Product)

–0.941**
(–5.490)

–1.155**
(–7.070)

Citizen Ideology Score

0.002
(1.060)

–0.003
(–1.150)

Constant

12.249**
(6.910)

15.025**
(8.810)

Year Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

N

1002

1002

R2

0.2004

0.2019

Crime Index
State Age

The t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated using Huber-White robust standard errors. Variable
definitions are in the Appendix.
+
Coefficient significant at the 10% level or less.
*
Coefficient significant at the 5% level or less.
**
Coefficient significant at less than the 1% level.
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Table 7: Productivity and Political Competition
Model 1
ln(Total
Opinions)

Dependent Variable

Model 2
ln(Total
Opinions)

Independent Variables
Election Partisan

0.958**
(7.410)

Election Non-Partisan

0.739**
(6.100)

Merit Plan

0.533**
(4.280)
–0.031*
(–1.990)

Tenure
0.299**
(2.750)

High Political Competition
Election Partisan
x High Political Competition

–0.743**
(–4.490)

Election Non-Partisan
x High Political Competition

–0.554**
(–3.570)

Merit Plan
x High Political Competition

–0.169
(–1.310)

Tenure
x High Political Competition

0.097
(0.540)

–0.016
(–0.870)
11.970**
(6.200)

15.831**
(8.340)

Year Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Judge Controls

Yes

Yes

State Controls

Yes

Yes

N

979

979

R2

0.2301

0.2055

Constant

The t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated using Huber-White robust standard errors. Variable
definitions are in the Appendix.
+
Coefficient significant at the 10% level or less.
*
Coefficient significant at the 5% level or less.
**
Coefficient significant at less than the 1% level.
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Table 8: Citations

Dependent Variable

Model 1
ln(Outside
State Citations)

Model 2
ln(Outside
State Citations)

Model 3
ln(Outside
State Citations)

Independent Variables
Election Partisan

–0.061**
(–3.070)

–0.061*
(–2.260)

Election Non-Partisan

–0.047*
(–2.580)

–0.089**
(–3.690)

Merit Plan

–0.081**
(–4.100)

–0.109**
(–4.140)

Tenure

0.004
(1.140)

High Political Competition

–0.016
(–0.770)

Election Partisan
x High Political Comp.

–0.008
(–0.260)

Election Non-Partisan
x High Political Comp.

0.131**
(4.030)

Merit Plan
x High Political Comp.

0.051*
(2.010)

Tenure
x High Political Comp.

0.084*
(2.300)

–0.006
(–1.420)

Number of Dissents

0.060**
(6.840)

0.060**
(6.710)

0.062**
(7.020)

West Key Pages

0.000
(0.450)

0.000
(0.180)

0.000
(0.380)

Opinion Length

0.034**
(20.320)

0.034**
(20.020)

0.034**
(20.190)

Administrative

–0.077**
(–3.000)

–0.075**
(–2.870)

–0.077**
(–2.940)

Attorney and Client

0.057+
(1.860)

0.049
(1.560)

0.051+
(1.650)

Capital Punishment

–0.112**
(–3.400)

–0.116**
(–3.530)

–0.115**
(–3.500)

Church and State

0.183
(0.760)

0.175
(0.720)

0.179
(0.720)

Commercial

0.160**
(6.330)

0.159**
(6.230)

0.160**
(6.250)

0.034

0.026

0.028

Criminal
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(1.470)

(1.100)

(1.170)

Family

0.077**
(2.920)

0.070**
(2.610)

0.070**
(2.600)

First Amendment

0.126
(1.570)

0.152+
(1.780)

0.162+
(1.920)

Labor

–0.053*
(–2.110)

–0.055*
(–2.160)

–0.053*
(–2.080)

Property

–0.005
(–0.180)

–0.006
(–0.210)

–0.002
(–0.090)

Rights

0.110**
(2.650)

0.093*
(2.180)

0.106*
(2.510)

Torts

0.145**
(5.660)

0.147**
(5.670)

0.148**
(5.670)

–3.031**
(–8.530)

–2.578**
(–6.520)

–3.067**
(–8.190)

Constant
Year Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Court Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

State Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

N

18360

17726

17726

R2

0.1309

0.1342

0.1322

The t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated using Huber-White robust standard errors. Variable
definitions are in the Appendix.
+
Coefficient significant at the 10% level or less.
*
Coefficient significant at the 5% level or less.
**
Coefficient significant at less than the 1% level.
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Table 9: Dissents

Dependent Variable

Model 1
ln(1+Dissent
Opinions)

Model 2
ln(1+Dissent
Opinions)

Independent Variables
Election Partisan

0.948**
(6.190)

Election Non-Partisan

0.759**
(5.520)

Merit Plan

0.005
(0.040)
–0.113**
(–5.960)

Tenure
High Political Competition

–0.041
(–0.310)

Election Partisan
x High Political Competition

–0.599**
(–2.680)

Election Non-Partisan
x High Political Competition

–0.410+
(–1.950)

Merit Plan
x High Political Competition

0.423*
(2.520)

–0.959**
(–4.220)

0.087**
(3.670)

Tenure
x High Political Competition
3.402
(1.430)

4.407+
(1.770)

Year Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Court Controls

Yes

Yes

State Controls

Yes

Yes

N

979

979

R2

0.2500

0.2070

Constant

The t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated using Huber-White robust standard errors. Variable
definitions are in the Appendix.
+
Coefficient significant at the 10% level or less.
*
Coefficient significant at the 5% level or less.
**
Coefficient significant at less than the 1% level.
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Table 10: Independence
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Independence

Independence

Independence

0.052
(0.810)

0.108
(1.630)

0.074
(0.900)

Election Non-Partisan

–0.068
(–1.100)

–0.019
(–0.310)

–0.114
(–1.350)

Merit Plan

–0.053
(–0.780)

–0.034
(–0.490)

–0.007
(–0.080)

Number of Dissenting Opinions

0.003*
(2.300)

0.003*
(2.320)

0.003*
(2.350)

Number of Dissenting Opinions
x Election Partisan

–0.006**
(–3.310)

–0.005**
(–2.790)

–0.005**
(–2.640)

Number of Dissenting Opinions
x Election Non-Partisan

0.001
(0.470)

0.002
(1.000)

0.002
(0.950)

Number of Dissenting Opinions
x Merit Plan

–0.003
(–0.920)

–0.002
(–0.770)

–0.003
(–0.930)

0.095
(1.450)

0.091
(1.310)

Opensecrets
x Election Partisan

–0.198**
(–2.700)

–0.197*
(–2.580)

Opensecrets
x Election Non-Partisan

–0.194*
(–2.370)

–0.171*
(–2.020)

Opensecrets
x Merit Plan

–0.120
(–1.580)

–0.111
(–1.240)

Dependent Variable
Independent Variables
Election Partisan

Opensecrets

High Political Comp.

–0.007
(–0.090)

Election Partisan
x High Political Comp.

0.046
(0.370)

Election Non-Partisan
x High Political Comp.

0.225*
(2.000)

Merit Plan
x High Political Comp.

–0.016
(–0.140)
2.894+
(1.890)

1.862
(1.220)

5.185*
(2.420)

Subject Matter Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

State Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Judge Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

N

327

327

318

Constant
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R2

0.2037

0.2336

0.2584

The t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated using Huber-White robust standard errors. Variable
definitions are in the Appendix.
+
Coefficient significant at the 10% level or less.
*
Coefficient significant at the 5% level or less.
**
Coefficient significant at less than the 1% level.
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Table 11: Selection Mechanisms and Quality
Selection Mechanism

Tenure

Productivity

Independence

Quality

Election Partisan

Lower

High

Unclear

Low

Election Non-Partisan

Lower

Middle

Unclear

Middle

Merit Plan

Higher

Middle

Unclear

Middle

Appointed

Higher

Low

Unclear

High
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Table 12
Mean
Open secrets

Mean
Salary
Difference
(Partner –
Associate
Justice
Salary)

Mean
Stable court

Mean
Court
Experience

Mean
Post-Law
School
Experience

Election Partisan

0.67a

1004a

0.08a

5.77

29.36b

Election Non-Partisan

0.36

872

0.28

6.67

30.72

Merit Plan

0.22

972

0.19

8.47

32.03

Appointed

0.14

822

0.25

7.28

32.27

Mean
Retirement
Close

Mean
Tenure

Mean
In-State Law
School

Mean
Active Judges

Mean
US News
Rank

Election Partisan

0.42c

7.10a

0.70a

9.55a

62.94a

Election Non-Partisan

0.22

7.09

0.67

8.25

58.78

Merit Plan

0.23

10.13

0.70

7.65

61.40

Appointed

0.30

9.58

0.33

7.71

32.34

a

t-test of difference in means for Election Partisan and Appointed Judge is significant at the <1% level.
t-test of difference in means for Election Partisan and Appointed Judge is significant at the 5% level.
c
t-test of difference in means for Election Partisan and Appointed Judge is significant at the 10% level.
b

Readers with comments should address them to:
Professor Eric A. Posner
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
eric_posner@law.uchicago.edu
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